Genocide Denial Criminalization:
Rwanda’s Application and Misuse of Genocide Denial Laws

Emily Brighton Egart
Law Student, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Fall 2022

Rwanda’s map. Source: The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021.

Introduction

The criminalization of genocide denial by legal means and constitutional provisions has gained popularity over the last few decades in post-genocide countries, especially in Rwanda. Although this effort may seem like a positive impact for acknowledging the grave atrocities that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and for the potential prevention of future atrocities, an issue arises where the Hutus are denied their story of genocide because, under the current regime, only the genocide of the Tutsis is validated. This harsh division of acknowledgment, or lack thereof, to the victims of the genocide is one example of current President Paul Kagame’s authoritarian regime and his effort to control the country’s political institutions and narratives, and to deflect criticism.

The Rwandan government’s laws criminalizing genocide denial may actually contribute to the risk of future genocidal acts due to the way its rhetoric reinforces ethnic divisions. Although the Rwandan government’s narrative claims there is no longer an ethnic division within the country, the reality is that the crimes against Hutus, including genocide, are being silenced. This can breed more division, which could potentially result in mass atrocities and genocide. Kagame’s regime’s severe restrictions on freedom of speech and press are a glaring red flag for the future of the country.

The Final Stage of Genocide: Denial

The denial stage of genocide is typically considered the final stage, which can last for years, decades, and even centuries.[1] Denial of the Holocaust is a quintessential example of genocide denial.[2] In this example, millions of people were murdered, specifically Jews, prior to and during the Second World War.[3] To this day, individuals and groups continue to actively deny the Holocaust ever occurred.[4]

In 1996, Gregory Stanton’s report, “The Eight Stages of Genocide,” was published by the U.S. Department of State. The report, as the title suggests, lays out the stages of genocide, listing denial as the final stage.[5] Stanton’s proposed measure to curb denial is criminal prosecution for genocide denialists.[6] Most countries within the European Union, as well as Russia and Israel, have laws in place that criminalize Holocaust denial. Additionally, as of 2006, the Ukrainian government prohibits the denial of the Holocaust and the Holodomor.[7] Despite the laws implemented in various nations and the potential for criminal prosecution, genocide denialists have developed a “cult-like” following, mainly through the internet.[8]

Importantly, many countries with strong freedom of speech and expression laws do not have laws that either expressly or implicitly criminalize or prohibit genocide denial.[9] These countries include the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.[10] The free speech principles preserved in these countries prevent genocide denial laws due to the violation they would have on Constitutional protections for such free speech.[11] Due to the free speech laws heavily protected in these countries, it is important to note the unique legal and moral issues that arise where a defendant is currently residing in or has fled to a country without genocide denial laws and is to be extradited to a country that has enacted genocide denial laws.[12] If an extradition petition is denied, the hosting nation risks appearing to excuse denialism.[13] But, if the petition is granted, the nation risks legal, moral, and public policy pushback as an assault on free speech.[14]

It is unlikely that genocide denial laws would ever exist in the United States due to the constitutional violations noted above regarding America’s free speech protections. However, France has managed to balance strong free speech laws, although less libertarian than in theUS., while “curbing hateful speech.”[15] Since hate speech, especially as it is driven by anti-Semitism, has become more exposed over the last decade or so, prosecuting individuals under hate speech in countries with strong free speech laws creates a murky legal issue. Even more problematic is the use of the internet and the anonymity that the medium provides for individuals seeking to promote their genocide denial ideology online.[16]

The Rwandan government portrays itself as a champion of free speech after the genocide, but in reality, the country’s constitution prohibits and criminalizes genocide denial.[17] On the face, Rwanda’s laws promoting freedom of speech while prohibiting genocide denial may seem well-intentioned, but the underlying caveats and interpretations of these laws suggest governmental control that is subtly and perilously encouraging future atrocities.

Brief History of the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath

In 1994, over the span of one hundred days, Hutu extremists killed an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.[18]  Following the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by current Rwandan President Paul Kagame, took control of the government.[19] Immediately following the RPF takeover, nearly 2 million Hutus fled into neighboring countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 1996, the RPF and the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) invaded the DRC, starting the First Congo War that lasted until 2003.[20] The Rwandan government justified the war as a way to combat the genocide perpetrators who fled to Congo and were likely to attack Tutsis in Congo and to return to attack Tutsis in Rwanda. Since the end of the conflict, Paul Kagame and the RPF-led Rwandan government have been actively opposing the denial and minimalization of the 1994 genocide by those involved or sympathetic to the previous Hutu regime.[21]

The current government believes genocide denial and the promotion of genocide are one of the biggest threats to the country’s internal security. The government’s “One Rwanda” movement aims to eliminate and prohibit identification by ethnicity or tribal affiliations in the country, as a means of “tackling ontological insecurity posed by former genocide perpetrators and their beliefs.” However, it could also be viewed as a way for the current regime to maintain its hold on the government.[22] The RPF has been criticized as an authoritarian dictatorship under the leadership of Paul Kagame, and human rights groups continue to criticize the RPF for “enacting policies which are meant to crack down on genocide denial and divisionism but instead violate Rwandans’ human rights.”[23] Paul Kagame and the RPF have gained control of every facet of the government, including a majority in the Supreme Court of Rwanda.[24]

The RPF perceives genocide denial as a threat to its legitimacy to hold political power.[25] Rwanda’s laws to combat genocide denial and revisionism have been compared, not without controversy, to the post-9/11 Patriot Act in the United States.[26] Several scholars have examined how the RPF has used the historical narratives that the group was the victor of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994) and that the group was the liberator of the genocide in 1994 to secure and maintain its political power.[27] When an individual questions the RPF’s involvement in either of these narratives, that questioning is often “reduced to genocide denial or revisionism of the nation’s history” which inevitably categorizes this individual as a criminal under Rwanda’s current laws.[28] One of the authors cited in this paper, Jonathan Beloff, found that “non-Rwandan researchers were often perceived with hesitation by Rwandans” due to “concerns of whether they would be critics of the RPF, and thus, seen as possibly trying to disrupt the social order established by the government.”[29]

Rwanda ranked 161 out of 179 in the 2013 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders.[30] Additionally, the country’s scores regarding the protection of a free press and free and open election processes, the general markers indicating a free and democratic society, are dangerously low.[31] As the RPF controls all elections, reports have deemed Rwanda to be “not an electoral democracy.[32] ” Furthermore, the country uses criminal prosecutions under the enacted genocide denial laws to further the oppressive political climate that restricts freedom of speech and expression.[33]

It is important to note the role the media and press played in the genocide in 1994, both before and during the killings, to bring context to the heightened control of the press by the current Rwandan government and the enactment of genocide denial laws.[34] Although similar laws have been enacted in other countries, Rwanda’s genocide denial laws are of interest due to the manner in which the laws are used: not only to restrict public debates but also to tightly regulate and restrict the media. A 2009 study by researchers at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government estimated that around 10% of the perpetrators in the genocide specifically took part in the violence and killings because of the propaganda generated and transmitted by Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines.[35] In 2003, judicial recognition of the role of the media in the genocide was brought about in the “Media Trial” when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted two individuals in charge of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, and another individual who was the director and editor of the newspaper Kangura, of genocide, incitement to genocide, and crimes against humanity.[36] Faith in the media was lost after these convictions, ultimately leading to “an environment conducive to strict regulation of freedom of expression.”[37]

In addition to its tight restrictions on freedom of the press and speech, another effort to prevent a recurrence of the violence and killings was to create an ethnicity-neutral state by encouraging Rwandans to abandon ethnic affiliations and by enacting laws that prohibit division or sectarianism.[38] The two movements combined have shifted Rwanda into a state void of individual autonomy and expression, ultimately silencing anyone who does not subscribe to the RPF’s and Paul Kagame’s ideology.

Genocide Denial Laws in Rwanda

Early in the 21^st century, Rwanda began to pass laws and draft a new constitution with the intention to prevent genocide and genocide ideology crimes.[39] A major criticism of these laws and the new Constitution is the vague terminology and a failure to precisely describe the “behavior that does or does not incur criminal culpability.”[40] The vagueness of the laws allows Rwanda’s government to weaponize them against any actor expressing views in opposition to the RPF and Rwandan government.[41]

In 2001, the first effort to codify the ethnicity-neutral state came about through Law No. 47/2001 on Sectarianism. This law proscribed “acts of discrimination and ‘sectarianism’ by prohibiting ‘the use of any speech, written statement or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination.’”[42] As noted above, the Rwandan government encouraged individuals to abandon ethnic affiliations, but due to this 2001 law, the encouragement was not merely a suggestion, but rather an order. This particular law has been interpreted so broadly that the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” have become criminalized.[43]

In 2003, the Constitution of Rwanda was ratified and the issue of reducing ethnic division was incorporated into the country’s constitutional principles.[44] There is an explicit goal in the fundamental principles listed in the Constitution’s preamble of fighting “genocide ideology.”[45] Furthermore, the preamble and article 9 in the “Fundamental Principles” chapter state that the People of Rwanda are committed to the “eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity.”[46] Under article 13, “revisionism, negationism, and trivialization of genocide are punishable by the law,” while under article 33, “propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division” are also punishable by law.[47] Although these statements occur in various forms multiple times throughout the Constitution, very little explanation, if any, is provided as to what these terms mean and what the implications are of these punishable-by-law actions.[48]

Even though other sections of the Rwandan Constitution explicitly guarantee free expression and speech,[49] the statements above clearly only guarantee freedom of expression with a laundry list of limitations and caveats, all vaguely described, leaving Rwandans with very little understanding of what they may legally express.[50] Scholars and NGOs have expressed concern and even condemned the Rwandan Constitution as “guarantee[ing] a continuation of the current regime in power” due to the suppression of political dissent and governmental control of the judiciary.[51] The limitations on free speech within the Constitution provide “enormous opportunities for abuse” and limitations on “association, as well as party political activities.”[52]

A few months after the introduction of the new Constitution, Law No. 33 bis/2003 on “Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes” was enacted.[53] Rwanda became a party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, among other international conventions, and this law was intended to create sanctions for the crimes listed in the conventions to which Rwanda was now a party. Issues arose, however, regarding the law’s criminal penalty of 10-20 years in prison for any individual who “will have publicly shown, by his or her words, writings, images, or by any other means, that he or she has negated the genocide committed, rudely minimized it or attempted to justify or approve its grounds, or any person who will have hidden or destroyed its evidence.”[54] This vague and overly broad statement likely covers a variety of actions any one individual might take, but due to the lack of clarity or specificities, this law does not provide a clear understanding as to what those punishable acts actually are. The ambiguity of the law is compounded by its provision that penalizes all “unsuccessful attempts to incite others to commit any crime under the law.”[55]

It is unclear what “rudely minimizing” actually means or entails, along with the many other broad and vague provisions, and how attempting to incite someone to deny the genocide can actually be proven if the individual did not “display any signs of ‘genocide denial.[56]’” When it comes to adjudicating crimes committed under this law, and others, judges are essentially left with broad discretion to interpret and implement the law(s) due to its abstract nature and concepts. Human Rights Watch (HRW) criticized this law and the lack of definitions and specificity in the language, and when asked what the definition of “divisionism” was, “not one judge interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers was able to do so.”[57] Not shockingly, the laws implemented around this time were “positively received in the pro-government Rwandan press” and Rwanda’s Prosecutor General defended the law by stressing that similar laws existed in European countries.[58]

Additionally, because the “2003 Law” lacks specificity and is generally ambiguous, the law, or at least a host of its provisions, likely constitutes a violation of international law which requires Rwanda to provide “precise legislation” if it restricts free speech and expression.[59] Rwanda’s own Constitution, written the same year as this law, declares that international law is held to a higher standard than Rwanda’s national laws and that the laws enacted must meet international law standards, yet the laws clearly do not meet this requirement in practice.[60]

In 2008, another law was introduced, Law No. 18/2008 “Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology,” which defined genocide ideology as “an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during the war.”[61] The law continues to vaguely and broadly define what type of behavior is characterized under this crime and that these vague and broadly defined actions could lead to 10-25 years in prison.[62] Moreover, if this crime is committed “through documents, speeches, pictures, media or any other means,” meaning if it is committed by the media or politicians, the minimum sentence starts at twenty years and could go up to twenty-five years in prison.[63] Just as with the 2003 Law, the 2008 Law found itself under scrutiny and criticism by Amnesty International, which reported that “[t]he [2008] law constitutes an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression under international law” and warned that the law “criminalizes dissenting voices,” specifically, leaders of opposing political parties.[64] The law was also used to “serve political and personal interests” such as property disputes and personal vendettas, as cited by HRW.[65] Additionally, HRW reported that media professionals “rarely criticized government policies, as a result of intimidation, threats, and prosecutions in previous years.”[66] Access to free media and education is critical for post-genocide societies to prevent propaganda and incitement of further atrocities, especially in Rwanda’s case and the propaganda that led to the 1994 atrocities. This law directly restricts the preventative measures the media could contribute to this post-genocide nation.[67]

An example of the misuse of the “2008 Law” is the case of Victoire Ingabire, who, after returning to Rwanda following an exile of sixteen years, hoped to run against President Paul Kagame in the 2010 presidential elections.[68] Ingabire was prosecuted for genocide ideology immediately after arriving on Rwandan soil. Her charges fell under the 2008 Law and her “charges were based on her call for the prosecution of war crimes committed by RPF members during the 1994 genocide.”[69] It was impossible for her to even participate in the elections due to her political party being denied registration, and, in the end, Kagame obtained 93.08% of the vote, an unlikely sweep of votes in truly free nations.[70] Under Organic Law No. 16/2003, political party registration was limited to the parties that “reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda,” which is, again, quite vague and the likely reason why Ingabire’s party was denied registration.[71] In essence, by simply running against Kagame, Ingabire was in violation of the laws because she represented opposition to the current leadership.

In 2012, a case in which two female journalists were arrested for publishing articles on several issues, including corruption among high-ranking government officials and human rights violations in the country, presents deeper issues with the laws’ vague and broad nature.[72] In the final ruling in this case, the Rwanda Supreme Court acknowledged that the concept of genocide minimization in the 2003 Law does, in fact, lack the precision necessary to meet the standards set by the Constitution and international law, but the Court failed to clarify further.[73] Additionally, the Court made clear that “intent has to be proven to find someone guilty of genocide minimization.”[74] The Court’s analysis and decision in this case also implied that the 2003 and 2008 laws are interlinked, thus likely transferring the lack of precision issue and the necessity for the element of intent issue over to the 2008 Law as well.[75]

Following this decision, a public prosecutor prosecuted “a radio presenter on the grounds of genocide denial for misspeaking while reading the news,” which goes directly against an issue the Supreme Court analyzed as an act not considered criminal in the case of the two journalists.[76] Additionally, the Supreme Court itself complicated matters even further, ultimately contradicting itself in the prosecution of Ingabire.[77] Since the 2008 Law (used in Ingabire’s prosecution) and the 2003 Law were interlinked in the 2012 case, it would seem appropriate that the 2008 Law would also lack precision and would be invalidated in Ingabire’s case.[78] However, the Supreme Court held that the 2008 Law was “not in violation of Rwanda’s Constitution,” which is a direct contradiction of its findings earlier in April 2012 in the case of the two journalists.[79] A reform process around the 2008 Law gained traction in 2013 which garnered some praise, but the reformed law did not adequately address the vagueness and overbreadth issues, ultimately leaving open the possibility for anyone – the government and the judiciary included – to exploit these laws to their advantage.[80]

There is a general theme to Rwanda’s laws and Constitutional provisions that tend to favor breadth and vagueness over specificity and clarity. A French US-based political scientist, Rene Lemarchand, known for his research on ethnic conflict and genocide in Rwanda, opined that the language of the 2003 Law is “[s]o vague and all-embracing . . . as to give the courts extraordinary latitude to indict suspects on the flimsiest grounds.”[81] The argument that the laws are still new or will be revised as they are brought up in court is not applicable here, as the number of cases filed under just “genocide ideology” and “genocide revisionism” crimes is in the thousands.[82] Some of the cases were brought up even before the laws and Constitution had been enacted, which means prosecutions and imprisonment were handed out ex post facto, without any legal grounding or foundation.[83] This alone ultimately justifies Lemarchand’s statement and signals that these Rwandan laws are used and weaponized for purposes far outside their intended reach.[84] But, under the RPF and Kagame’s authoritarian control, questioning this practice is not likely to bring about change, only more prosecutions of the “deniers.”

Anti-Identity Laws and International Human Rights Law

As noted above, the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda establishes that the state is determined to fight genocide ideology and eradicate any ethnic division within the country.[85] The terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were eliminated, and these words can only be used in a “context that negates their significance.”[86] Ultimately, the legal reforms and suppression of ethnicity and race, under the guise of national unity and future violence prevention, are pathways created to guarantee that the current leadership of Paul Kagame and the RPF remain in power. This ultimate goal is pursued by neutralizing critics and political adversaries through vague and overly-broad laws restricting speech and expression.

Article 14 of the Constitution states that survivors of genocide, the elderly, the disabled, the indigent, and other vulnerable groups may benefit from special measures such as a quota-based system for access to education and public employment.[87] This quota-based system, which was implemented before the genocide by the then -Hutu-led government, was eventually eliminated after the RPF and Kagame came to power because of its ethnicity-based privileged treatment, yet the Constitution still acknowledges these benefits for certain individuals.[88] Even though the wording does not explicitly acknowledge a particular group by name, the “victims of genocide” are narrowly defined as ‘the survivors who were rendered destitute by genocide against the Tutsi committed in Rwanda from October 1^st, 1990 to December 31^st, 1994.’”[89] On the face, the government wants to showcase a unified nation without any ethnic division, but it is clear by this restriction that the government only acknowledges the genocide of the Tutsis, not the Hutus.

By implementing laws that essentially restrict an individual’s ability to identify with a particular group, the Rwandan government is in violation of International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Identity and self-identification are inherent fundamental rights protected by IHRL, and these rights are applicable to both groups and individuals.[90] Individuals have the right to freely identify with a group based on ethnicity, religion, or language, and likewise, groups also have an inherent right to preserve and promote their identities.[91] In essence, IHRL reflects the complexity of an individual and group, including the identifiers the individual or group associates with.[92]

History, the truth about victimization, and collective memory are all important in post-genocide societies for the maintenance of peace and stability.[93] However, when the narrative of these elements is inflated or altered from reality, further violence may be encouraged, and the balancing of past grievances will likely not be achieved.[94] The post-genocide narrative of Rwanda denies the ethnic identity of Rwandans, and this was achieved not only by the implementation of laws and a Constitution but by an overhaul of Rwandan history in general.[95] The new government implemented a new flag, since the previous one was associated with the genocide, adopted a new national anthem without mention of ethnic groups, and created a new national seal because the old one was an image of a machete that could associate the country with the atrocities of the past.[96]

Additionally, the narrative in post-genocide Rwanda also “implies an eternal victimization of Tutsis, assuming that Rwandan history between colonization and the 1994 genocide consisted of a succession of persecutions of Tutsis, thus ignoring the fact that ‘not all Hutu benefited under the first two post-independence Hutu-dominated regimes.’”[97] This narrative directly contradicts everything the post-genocide government seeks to promote. It suggests that a certain group has been constantly and consistently oppressed, while another group has been the perpetual oppressor. In other words, it artificially labels the true victims and villains of the genocide.[98]

Any individual with a Hutu background in Rwanda is automatically considered as one who is associated with genocidaires.[99] The gacaca courts, community-style courts that were used after the genocide due to the massive number of cases and prosecutions, did not investigate or prosecute any acts by the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF). This reinforced the narrative that only the Hutus committed the crimes and only the Tutsis were the victims.[100] Furthermore, these courts failed to provide appropriate security for witnesses and victims who wished to testify, and false accusations were rarely investigated.[101] The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is also critiqued as a contributor to the stigmatization of certain groups because no RPF leaders were investigated or indicted while the court was in operation.[102] These two legal systems arguably contributed to the concept of one-sided justice and reinforced the narrative of Tutsi victimization.[103] Tutsi victimhood ultimately shapes who is recognized and how they are recognized as the victims of the 1994 atrocities, and this automatic victim status applied to the Tutsis manifests the label of genocidaires onto the Hutus.[104] Commemorations, memorials, and public references are made only to the Tutsis, with no regard for the Hutus victimized by the conflicts or by the RPF’s massacres of Hutus once it began to control the conflict late in 1994.[105]

It is rarely disputed that the RPF “committed war crimes during and after the genocide.”[106] The crimes committed by the RPF include willful killing of civilians, inflicting terror on those who stayed in the country and forcing individuals to flee due to a mixed ethnic background, and attacks on refugee camps.[107] The government gaslights the victims of these crimes and “alleges that victimization was caused by the victims themselves, as they were responsible for ‘their own persecution, mistreatment, disappearance, and even death.’”[108] Additionally, evidence shows that large-scale killings of moderate Hutus during and after the genocide was committed on political grounds because they were “accused by other Hutus of not collaborating with the atrocities, and later by Tutsis of having participated in the events.”[109] Not shockingly, these crimes against the Hutus were not recognized or investigated, and thus, their grief and experience is ignored.[110]

As one can imagine, teaching Rwandan history is a complex issue and the teachers are generally left without a curriculum to handle questions and approach the issues, even though there is an overall agreement that schools are important to promote “peace and reconciliation.”[111] The first UN Forum on Minority Issues stated that “unwanted assimilation imposed through the medium of education, or not only does the “national unity” approach undermine the minority rights of individuals and groups, but it also undermines the individual and political rights of its citizens. Enforced social segregation generated through educational processes are harmful to the rights and interests of minority communities and to the wider social interest.”[112] Rwanda’s strategy for education seemingly ignores the forum’s recommendations and “undermine the rights of minorities within their territory” through the efforts to “unify” the nation.[113]

The current Rwandan government “us[es] the law as an instrument to protect and promote the interests of a tiny, interconnected, and mostly anglophone political elite.”[114] The double standard set by the government inhibits any sort of long-term reconciliation or repair within the country.[115] The developments are consistently created from the top down and thus prevent “the emergence of more inclusive conceptions of citizenship and political participation” that bottom-up developments might warrant.[116]

Freedom House analyzes the political rights and civil liberties of countries, and concluded that, in 2014, Rwanda was still classified as “not free” because “basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.”[117] There have been continual and repeated violations of human rights with a “trend for killing, arresting and disappearing enemies at home.”[118] Additionally, through criminalizing political opposition, the government has criminalized “ethnic self-identification itself,” which then fails to meet the legal protections of such inherent rights like a right to self-identification and freedom of speech.[119] “The post-genocide regime adopted a ‘violent mode of management and discriminatory practices’ that continues rather than disrupts past governments that led to the conflicts in the first place.”[120]

Conclusion

The genocide ideology laws of Rwanda, although seemingly well-intentioned on the surface, ultimately “held back the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, and stunted economic growth” and “the current climate of silencing and fear generated around the law only makes such a massive human rights violation more likely.”[121] In theory, genocide denial laws may seem like a positive shift and have their benefits, but in Rwanda’s case, the manner in which they are implemented can be catastrophic for a post-genocide nation.

[1] Undeniably Difficult: Extradition and Genocide Denial Laws, Dylan Fotiadis, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV., 677, 2018, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/10; The Eight Stages of Genocide, Gregory Stanton, GENOCIDE WATCH, 1998, http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html

[2] Id.

[3] Fotiadis at 678.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Fotiadis at 680. The Holodomor, also known as “The Great Famine,” was an ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians by the former Soviet Union in 1933. Id. Many countries still do not recognize the Holodomor as genocide, and the atrocities continue to fall victim to denialism. Id.

[8] Fotiadis at 678.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Fotiadis at 681.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Fotiadis at 681.

[16] Fotiadis at 682. The internet, unfortunately, “has exposed a grim picture of the popularity of genocide denial” and the ability to remain anonymous on the internet “allows virtually complete impunity in spreading messages of hate and denialism.” Id.

[17] Fotiadis at 680; Denying Genocide or Denying Free Speech? A Case Study of the Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) Jansen, 12 Nw. J. Int’l Hum. Rts., 205, 2014, http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol12/iss2/3 (explaining that in articles 33 and 34 of the Rwandan Constitution, the right to freedom of expression is guaranteed).

[18] Rwanda’s Securitisation of Genocide Denial: A Political Mechanism for Power or to Combat Ontological Insecurity?, Jonathan R. Beloff, African Security Review, 184-203, 2021, 30:2, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1920996

[19] Beloff at 184-185.

[20] Id. The DRC was formerly the nation of Zaire. Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Beloff at 187.

[23] Beloff at 190.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Beloff at 191.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Denying Genocide or Denying Free Speech? A Case Study of the Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) Jansen, 12 Nw. J. Int’l Hum. Rts., 191, 2014, http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol12/iss2/3

[31] Jansen at 191.

[32] Id.

[33] Jansen at 192.

[34] Jansen at 194.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Jansen at 195.

[39] Jansen at 194.

[40] Id.

[41] Jansen at 192.

[42] Jansen at 195.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] See Jansen at 205-206. Article 33 of the Constitution states “Freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and the public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions determined by law.” Id. The next line right below states “Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law.” Id. Article 34 states “Freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the State.” Id. And, right below, the caveats are stated: “Freedom of speech and freedom of information shall not prejudice public order and good morals, the right of every citizen to honour, good reputation and the privacy of person and family life.” Id. Additionally, “[t]he conditions for exercising such freedoms are determined by law.” Id.

[50] Jansen at 196.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id.

[55] Id. “So not only is denying the genocide an offense, ‘incitement, by way of speech, image or writing, to commit . . . such a crime, even where not followed by an execution’ is as well.” Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Jansen at 197.

[58] Jansen at 197.

[59] Jansen at 192.

[60] Id.

[61] Jansen at 197.

[62] Id. The behavior that characterizes the crime of genocide ideology is outlined in article 3 of this law and states that “1) threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred; 2) marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading, creating confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred; 3) killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology.” Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Jansen at 198.

[65] Id.

[66] Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Their Compatability with International Human Rights Law, Flavia Saldanha Kroetz, 23 INT’l J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS., 328-354, 349, 2016, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ijmgr23&i=336

[67] Kroetz at 348.

[68] Jansen at 198.

[69] Id.

[70] Id.

[71] Kroetz at 333.

[72] See generally Jansen at 199 (explaining, in detail, the case of these two female journalists and the Rwandan Supreme Court’s analysis of the vague laws).

[73] Jansen at 204.

[74] Id.

[75] Id.

[76] Jansen at 193.

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80] Id. “The lack of precision of the genocide denial laws, as confirmed by the Supreme Court judgment, is relevant to the obligations regarding freedom of expression that Rwanda has under its own Constitution. It is also linked to the obligations Rwanda incurs under the international human rights treaties it has ratified, upon which the Constitution confers supremacy over Rwanda’s national laws.” Jansen at 205. The treaties most important here are the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id.; see also id. at 206 (explaining further the relation of the Constitution provisions with the African Charter treaty and ICCPR treaty).

[81] Jansen at 198.

[82] Jansen at 192.

[83] Id.

[84] Jansen at 207. “If no one, not even the supreme judicial body in the country, can determine what exactly constitutes the offense, the conclusion is easily drawn that the genocide denial laws do not meet the ‘prescribed by law’ criterion. This means that they constitute an impermissible restriction of free expression under the African Charter, the ICCPR, and also Rwanda’s Constitution.” Id.

[85] Kroetz at 332.

[86] Id.

[87] Kroetz at 334.

[88] Id.

[89] Id. (quoting the Rwandan Constitution at article 14).

[90] Kroetz at 336.

[91] Id.

[92] Id. “Identity closely relates to memory, as ‘[t]he core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity.’” Id. at 330.

[93] Kroetz at 342.

[94] Kroetz at 343.

[95] Id.

[96] Kroetz at 343.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Kroetz at 350.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] Id.

[104] Kroetz at 343.

[105] Id.

[106] Kroetz at 350.

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] Id.

[110] Id.

[111] Id.

[112] Kroetz at 345.

[113] Id.

[114] Id.

[115] Kroetz at 346.

[116] Id.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id.

[120] Id.

[121] Kroetz at 353.