CONFLICT IN YEMEN: MORE THAN A CONFLICT

Ryan Lins

INTRODUCTION

Yemen The World Factbook 2021. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/

In January 2011, the wave of protests of the Arab Spring swelled from North Africa and surged to the Middle East, reaching Yemen.  The reformist deals of the movement intersected with Yemen’s unique political and economic circumstances to lay the foundation for a national uprising and a subsequent revolution, civil war, international conflict, and enduring violence.  While the resolution and ultimate outcome of the conflict in Yemen remain to be seen, the devasting effects are readily apparent.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has called the conflict in Yemen “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.”[1]  The World Food Program (WFP), which is currently aiming to feed 12 million Yeminis every month, proclaimed that the “current level of hunger in Yemen is unprecedented.”[2]  A July 2019 WFP Situation Report estimates that 24.1 million Yeminis are in need of humanitarian assistance, 3.3 million people are internally displaced, and another 20.1 million people are food-insecure.[3]  Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that 14 million people in Yemen are at risk of starvation and death, and that approximately 3 million women and girls were at risk of violence at the start of 2018.[4]

A May 2019 report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that “nearly a quarter of a million people [have been] killed directly by fighting and indirectly through lack of access to food, health services, and infrastructure.”[5]  The report notes: “Of the dead, 60 percent are children under the age of five.”[6]  More precisely, that is 140,000 children under the age of five who have been killed in Yemen since the conflict began.[7]  Indeed, UNICEF described the conflict in Yemen as “living hell for children.”[8]  In 2019, a child died in Yemen every 11 minutes and 54 seconds.[9]  Because of the conflict, 14% of Yemini children, or 1.6 million, are living with malnutrition, and 36% are without access to schools.[10]  If the conflict continues through 2022, the UNDP estimates that—in projections that assume reduced conflict intensity—43% of Yemeni children will be without access to schools, 331,000 Yemeni children under the age of five will have been killed, and a Yemeni child will be dying every 7 minutes.[11]

Yemeni children (Mathieu Génon, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en)

In addition to the extreme human toll, which continues to disproportionately impact children, the conflict has accounted for $89 billion in lost economic output and reduced Yemen’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by $2,000 per capita.[13]  Should the conflict continue to 2030, lost economic output is projected to increase to $657 billion and a $4,600 reduction in per capita GDP.[14]

No matter how the tragedy of the conflict in Yemen is expressed or quantified, it is imperative that immediate action is taken to recognize the urgency of the situation, end the violence and atrocities being perpetrated, resolve the conflict peacefully, restore stability, and avoid future violence by ensuring lasting peace.  Only then can Yemen truly begin laying the foundation for an effective government, a culture of human rights, and sustainable development.  Only then will the international community have a meaningful opportunity to redress “one of the greatest preventable disasters facing humanity.”[15]  And more importantly, only then can the people—and especially the children— of Yemen begin to heal.

OVERVIEW

This paper provides an examination of the conflict in Yemen and seeks to provide a workable roadmap for a cessation of violence and sustainable peace.  The first section of the paper provides basic background information on Yemen to lay the foundation that is necessary to understand the political, economic, historical, and social dynamics that precipitated and continue to drive the conflict.

The second section of the paper analyzes the conflict in Yemen, with an emphasis on explaining the root causes of violence and describing the means by which violence has occurred and been sustained.  Resistance by the local population and by civil society within the country is discussed, and past international efforts at intervention are examined.  The conflict is also assessed from the perspective of international law, with the goal of properly classifying the various forms of violence that have been perpetrated throughout the conflict.

The third section of the paper discusses feasible options for bringing an end to the violence and resolving the conflict, including attendant challenges and likely outcomes.  Recommendations for implementing transitional justice are also proposed.  The paper concludes with suggestions concerning the next steps that are necessary to institute lasting peace and prevent future violence.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

The Kingdom of Yemen was established in 1918 and emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  In 1962, Arab nationalist revolutionaries overthrew the king and established the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen).  Shortly after the British withdrew in 1967 from their adjacent colony in present-day southern Yemen, a Marxist government was formed and established the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).   Decades of hostility between the neighboring states of North Yemen and South Yemen ensued, marked by inter- and intrastate conflict, until the two countries were unified in 1990 as the Republic of Yemen.

Yemen prior to 1990 (Map_of_North_and_South_Yemen.png: Orange Tuesday Flag_of_North_Yemen.svg: B1mbo, with subsequent precision by Fry1989 and Alkari Flag_of_South_Yemen.svg: Dbenbenn, with subsequent precision by Fry1989 and Alkari Governorates_of_Yemen_named.svg: Jarke derivative work: Mnmazur (talk), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)

Shortly after unification, in the early 1990s, a rebel movement began to emerge in northern Yemen.  The group was “often referred to as ‘Houthis’ because of the dominance of the Houthi tribe in its leadership.”[17]  The Houthi tribe and movement follows the Shia branch of Islam, specifically the minority Muslim Zaydi sect.[18]  “Today, the only significant Zaydi population is in northern Yemen,” a marked decline from the height of the Zaydi imamates of tenth and eleventh centuries.[19]  Importantly, “a Zaydi imam ruled much of present-day Yemen” until the 1962 coup,[20] in which Arab nationalist revolutionaries overthrew the Zaydi imam and established the Yemen Arab Republic.  “The new republic took a hostile attitude toward the Zaydis,” characterizing the Zaydi imams that formerly ruled as “avid—if not fanatical—tyrants who persecuted all non-Zaydi religious groups.”[21]  “The state persecuted conservative Zaydis and underfunded their communities, promoted Sunni proselytization in Zaydi territory, outlawed classical Zaydi teachings, and shut their educational institutions.”[22]  The climate was such that an individual was seemingly prohibited from being “both a Yemeni citizen and an adherent of Zaydism.”[23]  It was this “overall sense of grievance and neglect” that engendered the Houthi movement.[24]

The Houthis were “consistently sidelined in Yemeni politics” and began to develop a history of rebelling against a majority Sunni government.[25]  In an effort to draw attention to their political marginalization and to advocate for political inclusion, in 2004 the Houthis began protesting against the Yemeni government in mosques in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a, which then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh perceived as “a challenge to his rule.”[26]  After refusing to discourage the protests, the Houthis’ leader, Hussein al-Houthi, was killed by Yemeni government forces in Sana’a at the direction of President Saleh, and the nascent Houthi uprising was “brutally suppressed” before it could gain traction.[27]  As a result, the Houthis took up arms, and intermittent war between the Houthis and the Yemeni government continued until a ceasefire was brokered in 2010.

Protest in Sana’a (Sallam from Yemen, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en)

In January 2011, the anti-government demonstrations and protests of the Arab Spring began gaining momentum in the capital of Sana’a, eventually spreading to other major cities in Yemen, sometimes turning violent.  “By March [2011], the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for [President Saleh’s] immediate ouster.[28]  By the end of February 2012, President Saleh had stepped down, and his Vice President, Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi, had been elected president in an uncontested election.[29]  Newly- elected President Hadi convened a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 “to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues.”[30]  However, the Houthis felt that their interests were unrepresented in the NDC; consequently, they forged an alliance with recently ousted former-President Saleh, combined forces, and invaded the capital in September 2014 in “what appears to have been a demand for inclusion in the decision-making processes.”[31]  “In January 2015, the Houthis surrounded the presidential palace, [President] Hadi’s residence, and key government facilities, prompting Hadi and the cabinet to submit their resignations.”[32]  President Hadi managed to escape from the capital in February 2015; he then rescinded his resignation and absconded to Saudi Arabia.  The next month, March 2015, “Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Houthis and Houthi-affiliated forces.” [33]   These initial airstrikes exacerbated existing tensions and hostilities and marked the escalation of violence to full-blown civil war between the Houthis and the exiled Hadi government.  The undeclared civil war has since continued unabated and has, moreover, become enmeshed in broader regional and international conflicts.

The preceding summary of nearly a century of Yemini history is a major oversimplification.  The brief summary, however, is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of modern Yemeni history.  It is intended, instead, to give a window into Yemen’s long, complex culture of factionalized hostility, including a history of Houthi rebellion against a majority Sunni government; to describe generally the political dynamics and events that precipitated the current conflict; and to lay a basic foundation for an analysis and understanding of the root causes of the ongoing violence.

THE CONFLICT

Causes of Violence

The manifold causes of the ongoing violence in Yemen are complex and interrelated.  At a high level, they can be broadly divided into two basic categories: proximate and underlying causes.  The most visible proximate causes of the violence largely revolve around demographic issues including ethnicity, nationality, and religion, while root causes focus more on political, economic, and geostrategic considerations.  Contributing causes relating to climate issues reinforce many of these factors.

On the surface, the primary factors driving the violence in Yemen are ethnic and religious tensions centered on the Houthis, couched in narratives surrounding national security, order, and stability.   The Saudi-led coalition is targeting the Houthis, an ethno-religious subsect of Shia Islam, while Sunni Islam is and has been the majority religion in Yemen and significantly so in Saudi Arabia.[34]  The religious dimension of the conflict includes an additional international component, as Iran is believed by some to be providing support for the Shia Muslim minority Houthis in Yemen, as Iran is a majority Shia Muslim nation by a substantial margin.[35]  Saudi Arabia has, in part, publicly attempted to justify coalition hostilities toward the Houthis in terms of restoring security and order to Yemen, but the religious dynamics of the conflict have led to charges that Yemen has become a known theater for a regional proxy war, which “pits Saudi Arabia, the leading Sunni power—plus what remains of Yemen’s government—against northern-based Houthi rebels, who are covertly backed by Shia Iran.”[36]  Saudi Arabia has at times invoked and supported this narrative, “declaring the Houthis a proxy army for the Saudis’ archrival, Iran.”[37]

Some scholars, however, have questioned the true nature of the Houthis’ purported relationship with Iran, stating that “[a]lthough Iran has provided a small amount of funding to the Houthis, the Houthis do not identify with Iran or its form of Shi’ism and cannot be described as proxies for Iran.”[38]  Nevertheless, with Iran having already asserted its influence in Iraq following the U.S. intervention, and in Syria during the civil war, Iranian influence had permeated Saudi Arabia’s northern border, making “the specter of Shi’ite domination to the south more than the Saudis were willing to tolerate.”[39]  Hence, while Saudi Arabia’s targeting of the Houthis in Yemen was ostensibly about restoring the elected and internationally-recognized government of President Hadi, regional theocratic rivalries and a desire to establish political control in Yemen were more deeply-seated motivations.

Geopolitics also played a significant role in facilitating and sustaining violence.  The Saudi-led coalition that began targeting the Houthis with airstrikes in March 2015 was comprised of Arab states including Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates.  These states were willing to participate in bombing campaigns based, in large part, on their respective relationships with Saudi Arabia, a regional powerhouse with major political and economic clout to leverage in recruiting coalition members.

This dynamic is also visible in the role that the United States played in facilitating violence, considering its history of maintaining a close political special relationship with Saudi Arabia rooted in petrodollars and arms sales.  For instance, “[a]though the United States expressed alarm at the rising civilian casualties, it continued to arm the Saudis and provide logistical support.”[40]  Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are “two of the biggest buyers of U.S., British, and French weapons.”[41]  These trade relationships established lucrative financial incentives for the US and certain European nations to maintain the flow of arms, intelligence, and logistics support to the Saudi-led coalition—apparently lucrative enough that the United States failed to close the spigot of support to Saudi Arabia even in the face of unambiguous disapproval by the international community, such as from a member of the UN Group Of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen who urged “member states to no longer supply weapons to parties in the conflict,” because “[i]t is clear that the continued supply of weapons to parties to the conflict is perpetuating the conflict and prolonging the suffering of Yemeni people.”[42]  There were resolutions in Congress urging an end to U.S. support as well, and especially after the Khashoggi murder on October 2, 2018, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia was viewed with extreme disfavor but the administration maintained its relationship because of the economic ties.

Saudi Arabia and the United States both have a strong geo-strategic interest in seeing Saudi influence entrenched in Yemen.  Yemen is situated at the maritime chokepoint between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and as such is positioned to operate as a gatekeeper for Saudi’s maritime access to and from international shipping lanes.  At the other end of the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi’s archrival Iran is situated at the maritime chokepoint between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, positioned to operate as a maritime gatekeeper for Saudi Arabia’s only other maritime route to access global shipping lanes.  Therefore, Saudi influence in Yemen could insure the continued flow of Saudi oil tankers to international maritime shipping lanes—and the United States—in the contingency of an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz.  Similarly, Yemeni territory can provide Saudi Arabia terrestrial access and pipeline routes directly to the Arabian Sea and global maritime shipping routes, bypassing the oceanic gates of Bab al-mandab and Hormuz, which can be closed, altogether.

A Saudi-Led Military Strike

In addition to geostrategic factors, regional climate issues and attendant environmental concerns are protracting the conflict in Yemen.  Saudi Arabia and other coalition members are hungry for resources that could be secured by establishing influence in Yemen.  The Middle East has been facing a progressively increasing problem with water scarcity and access to clean water.  The area in and around the Arabian Peninsula in particular, “including Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, [is] facing unique [water scarcity and clean water access] problems that require global, immediate attention.  Besides their neighboring location, one shared factor of all these countries is their lack of water resources and poor water management.”[44]  The area is quite literally thirsty for “water resources and suitable land for agriculture” as “[m]uch of the land that is available for producing food is destroyed by increasing desertification.”[45]

The United Arab Emirates, which has played its own role in complicating efforts to end violence by sending forces and backing separatist groups in southern Yemen,[46] in 2005 had the “highest per capita consumption of water in the world,” according to a report from the Emirates Industrial Bank.[47]  At current usage rates, the country will deplete its natural freshwater resources “in about fifty years.”[48]  This projection shows how environmental problems driven by climate change and exacerbated by government mismanagement have become sufficiently urgent that the opportunity to acquire even a modest supplement of freshwater or arable land through extraterritorial influence is becoming an increasingly attractive prospect in the region.

Methods of Violence and Crimes Perpetrated

Much of the violence that has occurred in the conflict in Yemen has been rendered through airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led coalition.  While the airstrikes ostensibly target combatant Houthi and other anti-government forces, many civilians have been killed or injured.  The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented a total of 17,640 civilian casualties in Yemen, including 6,872 dead and 10,768 injured, between March 26, 2015, and November 8, 2018, with the majority of these casualties, 10,852, resulting from airstrikes conducted by the coalition.[49]  The number of civilian casualties caused by coalition airstrikes throughout the conflict has raised credible questions about the indiscriminate nature of the airstrikes, including whether civilians are being targeted intentionally.  Indeed, the first sorties flown in the conflict, on March 26, 2015, which commenced the coalition’s “intensive bombing campaign in Yemen,” killed “hundreds of civilians.”[50]  Human Rights Watch has documented approximately 90 coalition airstrikes that have “hit homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques.”[51]  Airstrikes have also resulted in the destruction of important cultural heritage sites, “including parts of the old city of Sana’a, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.”[52]

Ground and naval operations have occurred in addition to airstrikes, with the coalition deploying ground troops and warships alongside warplanes.[53]  The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that Saudi cross-border artillery has contributed to over 1,000 civilian deaths since 2016.[54]  While Saudi Arabia “has been responsible for the vast majority of the air and ground operations conducted by the coalition in Yemen,” other countries have meaningfully contributed to the violence in ancillary capacities, including “Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt.”[55]  ACLED concludes that, as a whole, the Saudi-led coalition has been the single most active conflict actor in Yemen since January 2016,[56] responsible for “over 8,000 of the approximately 11,700 fatalities reported in connection with direct targeting of civilians in Yemen” since 2015.[57]

To be sure, this is not to suggest that the Houthis have not also played a central role in perpetrating violence.  Houthi forces have conducted indiscriminate artillery attacks, shelling and firing ballistic missiles in populated areas of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.[58]  Both Houthi and coalition forces have engaged in the use of commonly banned weapons, with Houthi forces deploying landmines—many of which will likely long outlast the conflict and continue to pose grave dangers of killing or maiming civilians—despite Yemen being a signatory to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.[59]  HRW has determined that the Saudi-led coalition has used “at least six types of widely banned cluster munitions produced in Brazil, the US, and the UK” (Saudi Arabia and Yemen have not signed the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.).[60]  Both Houthi and Yemeni government forces have been accused of committing “arbitrary detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances” with impunity.[61]  Houthi forces have been documented taking hostages, “in large part to extort money from relatives or to exchange them for people held by opposing forces.”[62]  Sexual violence has also taken place: Yemeni government forces raped migrants and asylum seekers in Aden;[63] Sudanese troops raped a young Yemeni girl in northwest Yemen in March 2017.[64]

While neither Saudi Arabia nor Yemen are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the aforementioned acts committed by the members of the coalition and Houthis against noncombatant civilian populations constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute, as the acts fall under the enumerated acts of either Article 7 and/or 8, and comprise “a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”[65]

Given that the Houthis are originally an ethno-religious group, and by its own admission, the Saudi-led coalition is targeting members of the Houthi group with an evidenced intent to destroy the group “in whole or in part” by killing and causing serious bodily harm, an argument could theoretically be made that the coalition’s actions constitute the crime of genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute.[66]  However, an argument for genocide is confounded by the notion that, while the Houthi identity is rooted in a particular tribe and Zaydi Shia Islam, the Houthi identity has now assumed a primarily political focus, as evidenced by the inclusion of some Sunni members, and that is what the coalition is targeting—the Houthi movement, as opposed to the Houthi ethno-religious identity from which the now politically-oriented movement originated.  Political groups are not protected by Article 6.

It may be possible that a more effective argument for genocide could be developed by leveraging the national group protection that is included under Article 6, to adduce that the Saudi coalition is committing genocide against Yemenis.  However, it appears difficult to convincingly overcome the likely coalition defense that the intent of the coalition’s killing is not to destroy Yemenis but rather to restore order and the duly-elected, internationally-recognized Yemeni government.  Therefore, coalition and Houthi acts of violence are most appropriately defined as crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.    Yes; good.

Efforts to Intervene

Support and resistance from Yemeni civil society, outside the Houthi movement, has been largely ineffective, as the infrastructure of Yemeni civil society has been decimated, and the citizenry is facing widespread famine.  Further, “Yemeni activists, journalists, lawyers, and rights defenders worry about arrest, harassment, targeted violence,” and forced disappearances after documented harassment of the Yemeni intelligentsia by the Saudi-led coalition.[67]

International efforts at brokering a ceasefire by the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, and the United Nations have been largely ineffective.  Efforts to deliver humanitarian aid are routinely stifled by coalition restrictions on imports and Houthi confiscations of food and medical supplies.[68] The confiscation of food or its use as a tool to barter for sexual and other favors is a terrible problem in all conflict areas. The UN has appointed a Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, but the group’s remit is largely limited to monitoring and reporting.[69]

STEPS TOWARD A RESOLUTION AND LASTING PEACE

A 274-page report by the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen concludes that “[t]he best way to protect the Yemeni population is to stop the fighting by reaching a political settlement which includes measures for accountability.”[70]  This is, of course, easier said than done given the multitude of competing interests currently at play in the conflict.  Nevertheless, multilateral efforts should continue to be pursued.  The mandate of the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen should be renewed and expanded.  The Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the United Nations Security Council, together with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, should coordinate with the EU to ratchet up international pressure on both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition to meet for ceasefire talks.  The US as a permanent member of the UN Security Council will almost certainly obstruct such efforts, but the endeavor should nevertheless be pursued if for no reason other than to express the commitment of the broader international community to pursue a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The principle of universal jurisdiction should be invoked by any of the 160+-nations that use this form of adjudication, which can be used in domestic courts to prosecute individuals accused of directing the violence on the various sides to this conflict.

While neither Saudi Arabia nor Yemen have ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Court should be leveraged in any and all ways possible to publicly designate the coalition’s and the Houthis’ actions as war crimes and crimes against humanity, as appropriate.  Although almost certain to fail due to likely U.S. obstructionism, efforts should be made by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to refer war crimes and crimes against humanity from all parties involved in the conflict to the ICC to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to a UN Chapter VII resolution.  Countries that are providing weaponry and other forms of support to the coalition should continue to be pressured to end arms sales, especially for conventionally-banned weapons such as cluster munitions and landmines.  In the near term, such efforts could take the form of public opposition to and lobbying against the U.S. Senate’s upcoming vote on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), passage of which would reauthorize military support for Saudi Arabia.

After negative peace is achieved, retributive justice should be pursued by holding coalition and Houthi perpetrators accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, in a specially established UN or other multilateral tribunal if necessary, with a focus on restorative justice to enable reconciliation and healing of the people of Yemen.  Memorialization should be incorporated into the post-conflict landscape through a measure that appropriately pays homage, reminds of the past atrocities, and promotes healing, in equal parts, to be determined after adequate reflection on the entirety of the conflict once negative peace is restored.

CONCLUSION

            Once negative peace has been instituted, positive peace must be assured to prevent future atrocities.  Foremost, the Houthis should be meaningfully incorporated into the Yemeni political process, and Yemen’s political institutions should be reformed as needed to ensure adequate representation of politically, religiously, or ethnically marginalized, underrepresented, or minority groups going forward.

Of utmost importance, however, is fostering and maintaining a culture of politically active and vigilant citizens, in Yemen and around the world, which should be reinforced by a robust, tolerant, and capable civil society that seeks to hold leaders and fellow citizens always accountable for sustaining positive peace.

[1] United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Yemen crisis: What you need to know.”  https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[2] World Food Programme (WFP), “Yemen emergency.” https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/yemen-emergency. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[3] World Food Programme (WFP), “WFP Yemen Situation Report #49,” July 2019, p. 1. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/1eea3b5abfb4482c995fb99d13a4f631/download/.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[4] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Events of 2018.” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[5] Bohl, David, Taylor Hanna, Brendan R. Mapes, Jonathan D. Moyer, and Mickey Rafa, “Assessing the Impact of the War on Development in Yemen,” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), May 2019, p. 6. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/General/Docs/ImpactOfWarOnDevelopmentInYemen.pdf.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[6] ibid.

[7] ibid., p. 7.

[8] United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Conflict in Yemen: ‘A living hell for children.’”  https://www.unicef.org/mena/stories/conflict-yemen-living-hell-children.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[9] Bohl, David, Taylor Hanna, Brendan R. Mapes, Jonathan D. Moyer, and Mickey Rafa, “Assessing the Impact of the War on Development in Yemen,” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), May 2019, p. 7. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/General/Docs/ImpactOfWarOnDevelopmentInYemen.pdf.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[10] ibid.

[11] ibid., p. 8.

[12] https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811

[13] ibid.

[14] ibid.

[15] Bohl, David, Taylor Hanna, Brendan R. Mapes, Jonathan D. Moyer, and Mickey Rafa, “Assessing the Impact of the War on Development in Yemen,” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), May 2019, p. 14. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/General/Docs/ImpactOfWarOnDevelopmentInYemen.pdf.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[16] https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/08/saudi-arabia-acknowledges-defeat-in-yemen-starts-to-sue-for-peace-.html

[17] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[18] ibid., p. 58.

[19] ibid.

[20] ibid.

[21] ibid.

[22] ibid.

[23] ibid., p. 59.

[24] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[25] ibid, p. 58.

[26] Al-Jazeera, “Who are the Houthis in Yemen?” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[27] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[28] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook: Yemen.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html. Accessed December 16, 2016.

[29] ibid.

[30] ibid.

[31] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[32] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook: Yemen.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html. Accessed December 16, 2016.

[33] ibid.

[34] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html. Accessed December 16, 2019; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Yemen.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/summaries/YM-summary.pdf. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[35] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook: Iran.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[36] Pacific Council on International Policy, “Crisis in Yemen: Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Proxy Conflict.” https://www.pacificcouncil.org/activities/crisis-yemen-iran-and-saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-proxy-conflict. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[37] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 59.

[41] Reuters, “U.S., France, Britain may be complicit in Yemen war crimes, U.N. report says.” https://ru.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1VO11B. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[42] ibid.

[43] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423

[44] The Water Project, “Water in Crisis – Middle East.” https://thewaterproject.org/water-crisis/water-in-crisis-middle-east.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[45] ibid.

[46] Reuters, “UAE pulls some forces from Yemen’s Aden as deal nears to end standoff: witnesses.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/uae-pulls-some-forces-from-yemens-aden-as-deal-nears-to-end-standoff-witnesses-idUSKBN1WN2BL. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[47] The Water Project, “Water in Crisis – Middle East.” https://thewaterproject.org/water-crisis/water-in-crisis-middle-east.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[48] ibid.

[49] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Bachelet urges States with the power and influence to end starvation, killing of civilians in Yemen.” https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23855&LangID=E. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[50] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 60.

[51] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Events of 2018.” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[52] Hoffman, Valerie J., “Religion and Politics in the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath.” In Hoffman, Valerie J. (ed.), Making the New Middle East: Politics, Culture, and Human Rights, Syracuse University Press, 2019, p. 60.

[53] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Special Focus on Coalition Forces in the Middle East: The Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen.” https://www.acleddata.com/2018/07/31/special-focus-on-coalition-forces-in-the-middle-east-the-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen/.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[54] ibid.

[55] ibid.

[56] ibid.

[57] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Press Release: Yemen War Death Toll Exceeds 90,000 According to New ACLED Data for 2015.” http://acleddata.com/2019/06/18/press-release-yemen-war-death-toll-exceeds-90000-according-to-new-acled-data-for-2015/. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[58] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Events of 2018.” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[59] ibid.

[60] ibid.

[61] ibid.

[62] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Houthi Hostage-Taking – Arbitrary Detention, Torture, Enforced Disappearances Go Unpunished.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/25/yemen-houthi-hostage-taking. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[63] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Events of 2018.” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[64] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Special Focus on Coalition Forces in the Middle East: The Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen.” https://www.acleddata.com/2018/07/31/special-focus-on-coalition-forces-in-the-middle-east-the-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen/.  Accessed December 16, 2019.

[65] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Article 7, 8. https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RS-Eng.pdf, pp. 3-5.

[66] ibid., Article 6, p. 3.

[67] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Yemen: Houthi Hostage-Taking – Arbitrary Detention, Torture, Enforced Disappearances Go Unpunished.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/25/yemen-houthi-hostage-taking. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[68] ibid.

[69] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Council, “Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen.” https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/YemenGEE/Pages/Index.aspx. Accessed December 16, 2019.

[70] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, “Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and

abuses since September 2014 – Report of the detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International

and Regional Experts on Yemen.” https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A_HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF, p. 2.  Accessed December 16, 2019.